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MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
LAW: "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL"
SETH A. RIBNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the state of the environment has been a pressing na-
tional concern for many years, we are just now making a start to-
ward actually cleaning up the hazardous waste mess. Billions of
dollars in federal funds have been expended under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 1 which established Superfund 2 for the
cleanup of toxic waste sites. As of September 1988, however, only
thirty-four of the 1,175 toxic waste sites then on the proposed or
final National Priorities List ("NPL")a had been cleaned. 4 On av-
erage, over eight years pass between the time the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") first becomes aware of a hazardous
waste site and the time cleanup actually starts.5
The rationale underlying CERCLA is that the polluter should
pay for the costs of cleanup.6 It provides two mechanisms to ac-
* A.B. University of Pennsylvania (1979); A.M. University of Pennsylvania (1979); J.D.
Columbia Law School. Member of the New York Bar.
I Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). In 1986, Con-
gress amended CERCLA in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 and at 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611-12,4661-62, 4671-72, 9507-9508 (Supp. V
1987)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (Supp. V 1987).
3 The NPL is a prioritized list of sites of known or threatened release of hazardous
substances established by the EPA in conjunction with the states. See 42 U.S.C. §
9605(a)(8)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 300.66 (1989). The NPL serves as a basis
to guide the allocation of Superfund resources. See id. § 300.66(c)(2) (1989).
4 Acton, Understanding Superfund, A Progress Report, INsT. CIV. JUST. 48-49 (1989).
This study performed by the Rand Corporation places total outlays by the EPA under
Superfund through fiscal year 1988 at nearly $2.6 billion. Id. at 30-31. Once a site has been
remediated it is deleted from the NPL. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.66(c)(7) (1989). Only 26 sites
had been dropped from the NPL through March 1989. Acton, supra, at 61.
Acton, supra note 4, at 16-17.
6 See Brett, Insuring Against the Innovative Liabilities and Remedies Created by
Superfund, 6 J. ENVr'T. L. 1, 10 (1986); Acton, supra note 4, at 4, 9. In this vein, Congress
initially financed Superfund from a tax on crude oil, petroleum products and chemicals, 26
U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982), reasoning that the oil and chemical
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complish this goal. The government may perform cleanup work it-
self and then recover its Superfund outlays from those private par-
ties responsible for the pollution. Under this procedure Superfund
serves as a revolving fund that is replenished through EPA en-
forcement proceedings." The statute also authorizes the EPA to
enter settlements with responsible parties in advance of cleanup,
permitting the polluters to undertake site study and cleanup work
under EPA supervision.9 This latter authority is crucial because
now that more sites are advancing to the actual remediation stage,
the drain upon Superfund will compel the EPA to turn to private
parties to fund cleanup work in the first instance.10
American industry and its insurers have asked the courts to
determine whether there is insurance coverage for the centibillion
dollar liability imposed upon private parties by CERCLA and sim-
ilar state statutory schemes. To date, the judiciary has been unable
to provide meaningful guidance. A decade of lawsuits between in-
surers and insureds over environmental claims has produced a
body of irreconcilable precedents that vary from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction, court to court, and judge to judge. A survey of recent
decisions reveals a judiciary so divided that it is incapable of pro-
ducing any law in this area-only an ever increasing mass of cases.
I. THE CONFLICT IN THE COURTS
To date, three issues have predominated in environmental
coverage litigation:
industries provided the inputs to the majority of the substances that contribute hazardous
waste. See Acton, supra note 4, at 10. However, Congress broadened the revenue base in
SARA when it authorized a substantial increase in the Superfund appropriation. Under
SARA, Congress appropriated up to $8.5 billion to the fund for the five-year period which
began in October 1986. 42 U.S.C. 9611(a) (Supp. V 1987).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). As of September 1988, the EPA
had recovered less than ten percent of its outlays from private parties. Acton, supra note 4,
at 46, 57.
1 See Brett, supra note 6, at 10; Acton, supra note 4, at 8.
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1987 Supp. V); Acton, supra note 4, at 7-8, 24.
10 The Rand study concluded that:
the Superfund program is entering a more expensive phase, with planned remedial
activities representing a large expected outlay. If this pattern continues as more
sites mature to the remedial stage, the EPA will face strong pressure to achieve
sharply increased private takeover and financing if it is to meet these obligations
within currently forecasted authorization levels.
Acton, supra note 4, at 38; see Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp.
1171, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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(i) The scope of the clause in the standard comprehensive
general liability ("CGL") policy excluding coverage for pollution
unless the discharge of pollutants is "sudden and accidental";"'
(ii) Whether the costs of environmental cleanup are "dam-
ages" within the meaning of the CGL policy; 2 and
11 Recent cases holding that the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion bars cov-
erage for ordinary industrial discharges of waste include: United States Fidel15 & Guar. Co.
v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kentucky law); C.L. Hauthaway &
Sons v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989); Ray Indus. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1310, 1315-20 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Ogden Corp. v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., No. 88-4269, slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1989); Firemen's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1322-26 (E.D. Mich. 1988); EAD Metallurgical,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 701 F. Supp. 399, 400-02 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); State v. Amro
Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99, 109-10 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253, 259-61 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617, 619-22 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), afl'd, 875 F.2d
868 (6th Cir. 1989); Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515-16 (N.D. Fla.
1988); Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927, 929-30 (S.D. Ohio 1987),
aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989); American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Neville Chem. Co. 650 F. Supp. 929, 931-33 (W.D. Pa. 1987); International Surplus
Lines Ins. Co. v. Anderson Dev. Co., No. 86-CV-60392-AA, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Mich. 1987),
question certified to the Supreme Court of Mich., No. 87-2101 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1989) (or-
der), certification declined, 423 Mich. 1239 (1989); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General
Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1428-32 (D. Kan. 1987); International Minerals & Chem.
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 375-78, 522 N.E.2d 758, 767-69, appeal
denied, 122 I. 2d 576, 530 N.E.2d 246 (1988); Technician Elec. Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 75, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1049-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533-34 (1989);
Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 911, 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302, 549
N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (1989); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 151 Wis. 2d 593, 596, 445 N.W.2d
683, 685-87 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
Recent cases finding coverage for ordinary industrial discharges of waste notwithstand-
ing the terms of the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion include: Avondale Indus. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1204-06 (2d Cir 1989), modified, 894 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.
1990) (New York law); Higgins Indus. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 87-CV-10406, slip op.
at 3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 1989); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co.,
683 F. Supp. 1139, 1155-61 (W.D. Mich. 1988); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1362-64, 1367 (D. Del. 1987); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-50 (S.D. Fla. 1987); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 MI. App. 3d 378, 383-88, 535
N.E.2d 1071, 1075-78, appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 643, 545 N.E.2d 133 (1989); Upjohn Co. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 Mich. App. 706,708, 444 N.W.2d 813, 816-17 (1989); Polkow v.
Citizens Ins. Co., 180 Mich. App. 651, 657-58, 447 N.W.2d 853, 856 (1989) (per curiam);
Broadwell Realty Serv. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 526, 528 A.2d 76, 83-
86 (App. Div. 1987).
12 Recent cases holding that the costs of hazardous waste cleanup are "damages" within
the meaning of general liability insurance policies include: Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1206-07;
National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765, 766-67
(W.D. Okla. 1989); Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 88-5723, slip op. at 11-21
(E.D. Pa. May 9, 1989) (Missouri law); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty's, Inc., No. 83-
1441, slip op. at 4-8 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 1989); Higgins, slip op. at 3; Chesapeake UtiL. Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 561 (D. Del. 1988); Intel Corp. v. Hartford
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(iii) Whether letters to potentially responsible persons
(PRP's) under federal and state remedial programs constitute
"suits" that obligate an insurer to defend under the terms of the
CGL insuring agreement.18
Liability insurance for most commercial enterprises is written
under a standard. form of coverage common throughout the insur-
ance industry, with endorsements to meet the specialized needs of
Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1186-88 (N.D. Cal. 1988); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1168-70 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Ameri-
can Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-1994, slip op. at 14 n.2 (D.N.J. Oct.
14, 1988) (New York law), appeal dismissed, 879 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1989); New Castle
County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365-66; Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d
973, 977, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626-28 (1989); Upjohn, 178 Mich. App. at 713, 444 N.W.2d at
818-19; Polkow, 180 Mich. App. at 658-59, 447 N.W.2d at 856-57; CPS Chem. Co. v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175, 180, 536 A.2d 311, 315-18 (App. Div. 1988); Broadwell,
218 N.J. Super. at, 524, 528 A.2d at 81-83; C. D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crank-
shaft & Eng'g Co., No. 128PA88, slip op. at 19-28 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 1990); Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).
Recent cases holding that the costs of hazardous waste cleanup are not "damages"
within the meaning of general liability insurance policies include: Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mil-
liken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1988) (South Carolina law); Continental Ins. Cos.
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 983-85 (8th Cir.) (en banc)
(Missouri law), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822
F.2d 1348, 1350-52 (4th Cir.) (Maryland law), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Grisham v.
Maryland Casualty Co., No. 88-3063, slip op. (W.D. Ark. Jan. 18, 1989); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Ormond, No. 87-3038, slip op. (W.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 1989); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct.,
213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1989); Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F.
Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem.
Corp. 709 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Idaho 1989); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F.
Supp. 950, 954-55 (N.D. IMI. 1988); Cedar Chem. Co. v. American Universal Ins. Co., No. 87-
2838-4E, slip op. at 5-7 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 1989).
13 Recent cases holding that liability insurers have no duty to defend recipients of PRP
letters include: Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp.
958, 960-61 (D. Idaho 1989); Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 232-33
(W.D. Mich. 1989); Arco Indus. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. K88-380 CA4, slip op. at 14 (W.D.
Mich. June 26, 1989); Central Quality Servs. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 87-CV-74473-
DT, slip op. at 19 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 1989); Ryan, Klmek, Ryan Partnership v. Royal Ins.
Co., 728 F. Supp. 862, 866-68 (D.R.I. 1990); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics
Corp., No. 88-2220C (A), slip op. at 14-15 (D. Mo. Dec. 12, 1989); City of Evart v. Home Ins.
Co., No. 103621, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1989) (per curiam); Detrex Chem.
Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 448-50 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Technicon
Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124,145, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 104 (2d
Dep't 1988), affd on other grounds, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531
(1989).
Recent cases holding that liability insurers have a duty to defend recipients of PRP
letters include: Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1206; Higgins, slip op. at 7; American Motorists, slip
op. at 14 n.2; Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 388-89, 535 N.E.2d at 1078-79; Polkow,
180 Mich. App. at 654-57, 447 N.W.2d at 855-56; C.D. Spangler, slip op. at 28-31.
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particular insureds. 4 The rationale for standardization is that it
reduces the cost of insurance by permitting insurers to pool their
loss experience, promotes certainty for the insurer and insured and
supplies the coverage most businesses require. Standardization also
simplifies the purchase of supplementary insurance not included in
the customary package but specifically designed to fill gaps in the
standard coverage.15 From their inception in the 1930. standard
liability policy forms and endorsements have been prepared by in-
surance industry associations."6 The current rating organization
and policy drafting body for the insurance industry is the Insur-
ance Services Office ("ISO").Y7
Although insurance contract interpretation is first and fore-
most a question of state contract law, the basic principles for inter-
preting insurance contracts do not vary widely from state to state.
Accordingly, since the language of the policy provisions in issue is
substantially the same, the courts should reach similar conclusions.
But they do not. Moreover, since only six state courts of last resort
have touched upon any of the issues actively litigated today,8 fed-
14 See Obrist, New Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy-A Coverage
Analysis, 1966 Def. Res. Inst. 5, reprinted in General Liability Insurance-1973 Revisions,
1974 DEF. REs. INST. 38 (F. Bardenwerper & D. Hirsch eds.). The largest commercial in-
sureds, whose insurance requirements are too complicated for standard form coverage, nego-
tiate their insurance contracts. These negotiations are between insurance underwriters on
the one side and corporate risk managers, typically assisted by commercial brokers, on the
other. The product is a custom-tailored document known as a manuscript policy. See Os-
trager & Ichel, Should the Business Insurance Policy Be Construed Against tha Insurer?
Another Look at the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 33 FED' INS. COUNS. Q. 273, 277-
85 (1983); Ostrager & Ichel, The Role of Bargaining Power Evidence In The Construction
Of The Business Insurance Policy; An Update, Forum 577, 577-79 (1983). Manuscript lia-
bility insurance contracts often incorporate standard-form clauses because risk managers
desire the certainty that they can achieve by using standard provisions where appropriate.
15 See R. KEETON & A. WrIDss, INSURANCE LAW § 2.8(c) (1988); Obrist, supra note 14, at
5.
16 See Obrist, supra note 14, at 5.
17 See In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464, 468-69, 479 (NJ). Cal.
1989).
Is See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 340, 380 S.E.2d 686, 690
(1989) (four to three decision finding the term "sudden" as used in the standard pollution
exclusion ambiguous); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 229 (Me. 1980) (early
pollution exclusion case holding that exclusions apply to discharges of waste but obliging
insurers to defend class action suit against operator of industrial waste facility because no
allegations in complaint relating to manner in which discharge occurred); Troy Mills, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 89-311, slip op. (Sup. Ct. N.H. Feb. 13, 1990); Technicon
Elec. Corp. v. American Home Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 75, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050-51, 544
N.Y.S.2d 531, 533-34 (1989) (holding terms of pollution exclusion unambiguous and finding
that unexpected damage resulting from intentional discharge of pollutants not covered);
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eral judges, obligated to decide state law questions as would a
state's highest court, 9 have the license, if they choose, to decide
cases virtually unrestricted by precedent.20
Adding to the uncertainty is the inconsistent application of
choice of law rules in the insurance coverage area. Traditionally, in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties to a con-
tract, the law of the place of contracting governs." However, as the
courts increasingly resort to interest analysis,22 the subjective na-
ture of the inquiry and the variety of state interests factored into
the equation make conflicts of law issues a wild card. At least one
court has concluded that a recent New Jersey decision" is a bid to
Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 243, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1989)
(standard pollution exclusion bars coverage even though insured was not the "actual pol-
luter" where discharges of waste not "sudden and accidental"); C. D. Spangler Constr. Co. v.
Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., No. 128PA88, slip op. (N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 1990) (in-
sured's expenses in complying with cleanup orders are "damages" within the meaning of
CGL policies and administrative orders requiring cleanup of hazardous waste are "suits"
which trigger an insurer's duty to defend); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless
Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 696-700, 340 S.E.2d 374, 380-383 (1986) (gradual leaching of waste at
a dumpsite although arguably "accidental" not "sudden" within the meaning of the stan-
dard pollution exclusion); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784
P.2d 507 (1990) (response costs are "damages" within the meaning of CGL insuring
agreement).
19 See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); West v. A.T.T. Co.,
311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
20 See, e.g., Ray Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1310, 1315-20 (E.D.
Mich.) (disagreeing with recent Michigan intermediate appellate court decision holding
terms of pollution exclusion ambiguous); Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 697 F.
Supp. 1314, 1318-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that liability insurer had duty to defend a
PRP letter despite contrary New York intermediate appellate court ruling handed down two
weeks earlier), afl'd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989).
21 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1934). See Christensen & Oltman, The
Impact of Choice of Law on Coverage Disputes, Mealey's Lit. Rpts. (Insurance) 4110, 4111-
12 (1987).
22 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNLIcr oF LAws §§ 6, 188 (1979). Comment f to
Section 193 of the Restatement Second suggests that courts should treat a multiple risk
policy that insures against risks located in several states as separate policies, with the rights
and obligations of the parties under the contract determined in accordance with the local
law of the principal location of each risk. Id. § 193 comment F.
2 Westinghouse Elee. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 233 N.J. Super. 463, 559 A.2d 435
(App. Div. 1989). Westinghouse was an "omnibus" suit against 144 liability insurers in
which Westinghouse sought a declaration of coverage for its hazardous waste exposure na-
tionwide. The trial court dismissed all claims pertaining to liability arising outside New
Jersey on forum non conveniens grounds. In reversing, the Appellate Division commented:
There can be no doubt that the economic prosperity we enjoy in this State is in
large measure attributable to major national corporations which, like Westing-
house, are incorporated elsewhere but engage in substantial business activity here,
employ our residents, and contribute to our tax base. There is no question that
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attract industry to the state by extending the benefit of local pro-
insured environmental coverage law to national7 corporations that
do substantial business in New Jersey.24
While more consensus among the state judiciaries would be a
welcome development, the system can ultimately achieve stability
even if the substantive law differs among the states, provided that
the judges apply choice of law principles in a predictable manner.
A far greater concern is that the sharp divisions within the judici-
ary on environmental coverage matters are iearing the institutional
fabric that normally constrains the courts. Judges have demon-
strated a willingness to break conventions of precedent and comity
and the federal bench has increasingly declined to defer to state
tribunals on issues of state law. As a result, the law of a given juris-
diction is always subject to question and those judges who believe
they know better than the last court that decided an issue have set
the tone for the debate that rages in the reporters.
they are entitled, as are all our citizens, to as full an access to our court system as
is consistent with fundamental principles of acquiring and exercising jurisdiction.
Id. at 468, 559 A.2d at 437-38. Although choice of law issues were not reached at the trial
level and not briefed by the parties on appeal, the court continued:
While not intending to deprecate the legitimacy of local concern for and control
over its own environmental contamination, we nevertheless cannot conceive that
the operative contract language in a single set of insurance policies issued by a
group of insurers for the purpose of providing integrated comprehensive coverage
for nationwide risks could mean something different in every state of the union.
Id. at 476, 559 A.2d at 441-42.
U Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (D. Md.
1989). In declining to apply New Jersey law to a coverage action concerning Maryland haz-
ardous waste sites, the court commented:
Acknowledging that the parties had not even briefed the conflicts question in
Westinghouse, the Appellate Division reached out to address it in dictum. It
might be inferred that it was motivated to do so, at least in part, by a perception
of an extraneous self-interest: inducing large corporations to do business in the
state by the creation of a body of law favorable to insureds....
It is entirely proper for the courts of New Jersey, subject to legislative stric-
tures, to make rulings on questions of law against the background of what they
perceive the underlying public policy of the state to be. However, a state's legiti-
mate interest in attracting corporate business does not justify its encouragement
of forum shopping to its own courts or its intrusion upon the sovereign power of
its sister states to make their own decisions concerning matters directly affecting
their interests within their borders.
Id. at 1257-58; cf. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YaF L.J. 663, 670 (1974) (criticizing Delaware whose "courts have undertaken to carry out
the 'public policy' of the state and create a 'favorable climate' for management").
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
III. THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
A. The "Occurrence" Definition and the Pollution Exclusion
1. The development of the "occurrence" policy
Until the mid-1960s, standard form liability policies set the
outer parameters of the insurer's risk by limiting coverage to bod-
ily injury or property damage "caused by accident."25 As con-
ceived, "accident"-based coverage was limited to discrete, sudden
events fixed in time and place." The policies, however, did not de-
fine the term "accident" and judicial construction broadened the
"accident" concept to cover injuries or damage resulting from
gradual processes.
In 1966, the insurance industry revised the terms of the stan-
dard-form CGL policy.28 The principal innovation of the new pol-
icy was to change the event triggering the insurer's contractual ob-
ligations from an "accident" to an "occurrence."29 Although large
commercial insureds had been negotiating for and receiving "oc-
currence"-based coverage since the 1940's,30 "occurrence" policies
now became the industry standard.
The new CGL policy eliminated suddenness as a requirement
when injury occurred, making coverage dependent solely upon the
degree of foreseeability of the resulting harm. 1 The 1966 revision
defined the term "occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious
exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
25 See Bean, The Accident Versus the Occurrence Concept, 1959 Ins. L.J. 550, 551;
Rosow & Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretative Problems of "Occurrence" in Com-
prehensive General Liability Policies, 16 Forum 1148, 1149 (1981); Note, The Pollution
Exclusion Through The Looking Glass, 74 Geo. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986).
26 See Bean, supra note 25, at 551, 554-55; Snow, Occurrence vs. Accident - Just
What is Covered?, 21 Ins. Couns. J. 30, 32 (1954); Note, supra note 25, at 1241-42.
27 See, e.g., Beryllium Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 223 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1955)
(Pennsylvania law); Employers Ins. Co. v. Rives, 264 Ala. 310, 87 So. 2d 653 (1955); Cana-
dian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 411 M11. 325, 104 N.E.2d 250 (1952); The
Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Bean, supra note
25, at 555; Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpretation and
Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 497, 499
(1981); Note, supra note 25, at 1243-46.
28 See Obrist, supra note 14; B. OSTRAGER & T. NwmAN, HANDBOOK ON INSUnNCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 7.03[a] (2d ed. 1989).
219 See Obrist, supra note 14, at 6-7; Rosow & Liederman, supra note 25, at 1149.
20 See Bean, supra note 25, at 552; Snow, supra note 26, at 37; Visscher, The Use of
"Occurrence" for "Accident" as an Extension of Coverage, 1944 Ins. L.J. 587.
*1 See Obrist, supra note 14, at 6.
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from the standpoint of the insured."32 While the new policy ex-
pressly afforded coverage for "exposure to conditions," the change
in wording only confirmed the then prevailing judicial interpreta-
tion of the "caused by accident" language.
2. The origin of provisions excluding coverage for pollution
Despite the shift to "occurrence"-based coverage, the new pol-
icy did not change the basic underwriting doctrine that the results
of ordinary business operations are costs not covered by insur-
ance.33 The "occurrence" language reflected this limitation on cov-
erage by requiring that the "exposure to conditions" be "neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."3 4 How-
ever, when presented with the potentially catastrophic losses posed
by pollution hazards in the late 1960's, 5 the insurance industry
sought to reinforce its original intent with a bright-line standard
for excluding industrial pollution."
Although some companies developed their own variants,3 7 the
32 Reichenberger, The General Liability Insurance Policies-Analysis of 1973 Revi-
sions, in General Liability Insurance-973 Revisions, 1974 Def. Res. Inst. 8 (F.
Bardenwerper & D. Hirsch eds.). The drafters of the 1973 ISO revision of the standard form
liability policy defined the term "occurrence" as: "an accident, including continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id. at 9.
33 See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 15 at § 5.3(c); B. OSTRAGER & T. NEwMAN, supra
note 28, at § 7.02; Glad, Heidenreich & Vobornik, Fortuity: A Fundament of Coverage, 11
Ins. Lit. Rptr. 402 (1989); Brett, supra note 6, at 54-55 (1986); Bean, supra note 25, at 556.
-' See B. OSTRAGER & T. N-WMAN, supra note 28, at § 7.03[a]; Brett, supra note 6, at
55-59.
" See Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Forum
551, 553 (1980); Note, supra note 25, at 1251; Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Envi-
ronmental Litigation, 11 Forum 762, 766-67 (1976).
38 See Note, supra note 25, at 1248, 1251-53; C. Cox, Liability Insurance in the Era of
the Consumer, a Speech Before the Annual Conference of the American Society of Insur-
ance Management (Apr. 9, 1970), quoted in Soderstrom, supra note 35, at 767; Ashcraft,
Ecology, Environment Insurance and the Law, 21 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. 37, 53-55 (Fall
1970).
A number of courts had held that under the pre-1966 language, environmental nui-
sances were not "caused by accident" and thus not covered risks because the pollution dam-
age was the expected result of the insured's ordinary business operations. See American
Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv. Co., 270 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1959) (Minne-
sota law); Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 38 ll App. 2d 249, 187 N.E.2d 12
(1962); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 235 A.2d 556
(1967); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1952); Town of
Tieton v. General Ins. Co., 61 Wash. 2d 518, 380 P.2d 127 (1963); Clark v. London & Lanca-
shire Indem. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 258, 124 N.W.2d 29 (1963).
37 See B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 28, at § 8.02[b]. A significant variant is
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
salient feature of this first generation of pollution exclusions was
their focus upon the discharge of pollutants rather than the result-
ing harm. The standard pollution exclusion developed by the In-
surance Rating Board, Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau and
Multi-Line Insurance Rating Bureau provided:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemi-
cals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contami-
nants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any wa-
tercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental.38
The exclusion excepted from its terms "sudden and accidental"
discharges of pollutants because the drafters viewed the harm re-
sulting from such events as neither an ordinary nor expected part
of an insured's business and thus properly covered by the policy. 9
B. The Pollution Exclusion in the Courts
At first, the courts were not kind to the pollution exclusion,
effectively reading the exclusion out of the standard policy by ap-
plying the doctrine that ambiguous language in insurance contracts
should be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of cov-
erage.40 Thus, courts initially held that the term "accident" was
the pollution exclusion used by the Travelers Insurance Company which provides that no
coverage is afforded for:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of any emission, discharge, seepage,
release or escape of any liquid, solid, gaseous or thermal waste or pollutant if such
emission, discharge, seepage, release or escape is either expected or intended from
the standpoint of any insured or any person or organization for whose acts or
omissions any insured is liable, but this exclusion does not apply to the emission,
discharge, seepage, release or escape of petroleum or any petroleum derivative into
any body of water.
Id. For applications of the Travelers pollution exclusion, see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham
Indus. Laboratories, 883 F.2d 1092 (1st Cir. 1989); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414
A.2d 220 (Me. 1980).
38 Pollution Coverage Exclusions, 11 For the Defense 75 (1970).
39 Id.; see Cox, supra note 36; Ashcraft, supra note 36, at 53-55; Abraham, Environ-
mental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 942, 952-53 (1988).
40 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 App. Div. 2d 486, 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603, 605 (4th Dep't 1980) ("The term 'sudden and accidental' must be construed in its rele-
vant context. The relevant context to be considered is the fact that it is a term employed by
an insurer in the contract and should be given the construction most favorable to the in-
sured"). Recent commentary has questioned the applicability of the contra proferentem.
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concerned with whether the insured intended the damage as op-
posed to the discharge of pollutants and that the term "sudden"
did not connote brevity but in the context of the exclusion meant
only "unexpected."41 Under this analysis, the pollution exclusion
lost its bright-line quality and its fate became linked to the judicial
construction of the subjective intent-based "occurrence" language.
One court finding the language ambiguous stated that:
When viewed in light of the case law cited, the clause can be
interpreted as simply a restatement of the definition of "occur-
rence"--that is, that the policy will cover claims where the injury
was "neither expected nor intended". It is a reaffirmation of the
principle that coverage will not be provided for intended results
of intentional acts but will be provided for the unintended results
doctrine in disputes between insurers and sophisticated insureds. See supra note 19; B. Os-
TRAoER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 28, at § 1.031b]; Note, Insurance As Contract: The Argu-
ment for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1821 (1988); see also First
State Underwriters Agency v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1314 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986)
(principle of strict construction should not apply where sophisticated parties negotiate and
execute insurance contract even when they opt to utilize form paper); Schering Corp. v.
Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (questioning applicability of contra profer-
entem doctrine in situation involving large, sophisticated, counselled insured).
41 See Molten, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95
(Ala. 1977) (pollution exclusion did not apply to property damage caused by mudslides from
insured's construction site); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, ,, 467
N.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1984) (pollution exclusion did not bar coverage for claim alleging that
carbon monoxide and soot "regularly" escaped from garage into third-party's condominium
because relevant question was not time frame involved but whether insured, operator of
garage, could have "intended or expected" pollutants to enter the adjacent residential struc-
ture); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. 648, 653, 477 N.E.2d 146, 149-50
(holding damage to waterways from oil that leaked from corroded underground fuel tanks
was "sudden and accidental" within meaning of exception to pollution exclusion), review
denied, 395 Mass. 1102, 480 N3E.2d 24 (1985); Jackson Township Mun. UtiL Auth. v. Hart-
ford Ace. & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 164, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (Law Div. 1982) (pollu-
tion exclusion simply a "restatement of the definition of 'occurrence' "); Allstate Ins. Co., 73
App. Div. at 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (finding pollution from leaking oil tank covered by
policy because "the word 'sudden' as used in liability insurance need not be limited to an
instantaneous happening"); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 App. Div. 2d 1014,409
N.Y.S.2d 294 (4th Dep't 1978) (damage to vineyards and crops from insured's commercial
spraying operation not excluded because insured did not intend dispersal of spray onto ad-
joining property); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App.
3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984) (court imposed duty to defend generator of hazardous waste
in proceedings arising from pollution at dumpsite because no allegations that insured ex-
pected or intended release at dumpsite); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc.,
34 Wash. App. 708, -, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266 (court refused to "permit the ambiguous
pollution exclusion clause to unfairly devour much of the policy and relieve the insurer from
liability clearly within the spirit and intendment of the policy"), review denied, 100 Wash.
2d 1018 (1983).
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of an intentional act.42
The precedential effect of the early decisions was substantial. 8
By the mid-1980's, however, the courts began to approach the ex-
clusion differently, perhaps because the cases did not involve mud-
slides, leaking oil tanks, crop sprayers and garages but instead con-
cerned the industrial pollution at which the exclusion was clearly
directed. The cases that enforced the pollution exclusion in the in-
dustrial context created a competing body of case law.44
For example, in Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.,4  the
Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the insurer had no duty to
defend or indemnify in an action alleging twenty-five years of con-
tamination on a regular basis from trichlorethylene used in the in-
sured's steel cutting and stripping business. Similarly, in Great
Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,48 an
EPA complaint alleged that soil and water contamination had
taken place as a concomitant of the insured's barrel reconditioning
business. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
applying New Hampshire law, found that the government's suit
did not allege an "occurrence," nor make an allegation of "sudden
and accidental" discharge.
In the last several years most courts have adopted the insur-
ance industry's position both with respect to the exclusion's focus
on discharges rather than the resulting harm and with respect to
the meaning of the term "sudden. ' 47 One decision that tipped the
scale in this regard was Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 48
That case concerned an insurer's obligations to the owner of a
42 Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth., 186 N.J. Super. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994.
4" See Shapiro, 19 Mass. App. at 653, 477 N.E.2d at 149-50 (citing cases); Buckeye
Union Ins. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d at 138, 477 N.E.2d at 1235 (same); United Pac. Ins. Co. 34
Wash. App. at 715, 664 P.2d at 1265 (same).
4 See Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 669 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D.
Mich. 1986), appeal dismissed, 838 F.2d 470 (1988); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549,1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 696-700, 340 S.E.2d 374, 380-83 (1986); Transamerica Ins.
Corp. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 139, 711 P.2d 212, 214, petition denied, 301 Or. 76, 717
P.2d 631 (1986); City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 382, 344
N.W.2d 523, 526-27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
45 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820 (1984).
'I 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984).
47 See supra note 11.
48 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987), question certified to Supreme Court of Georgia,
865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir.), certified question answered, 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989).
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landfill in connection with an EPA investigation and cleanup. In a
detailed analysis, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Georgia found that the pollution exclusion barred
coverage for cleanup costs imposed by the EPA.4 The court as-
sumed for purposes of its analysis that the insured was unaware of
both the continuous dumping of hazardous wastes at the site and
the potential that the contaminants would leach into the surround-
ing soil and groundwater.5 The court nevertheless found that the
dumping of waste for a period of years and/or the leaching into the
soil could not be considered "sudden." 51 In a widely quoted pas-
sage the court stated:
[]n drafting the pollution exclusion clause the insurance industry
clearly intended to limit coverage for pollution-related damages
to situations where such damages are caused by sudden pollution
incidents involving equipment malfunctions, explosions and the
like. The word sudden was intended by the industry to have its
usual temporal meaning,... and a reasonable insured with any
degree of common sense would ssume the word to have that
.usual meaning.... Only in the minds of hypercreative lawyers
could the word "sudden" be stripped of its essential temporal
attributes.5 2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Georgia the ques-
tion of whether the pollution exclusion precludes coverage "for the
environmental contamination caused by the discharge of pollutants
at the site over an extended period of time."5" In a four-to-three
decision, a majority of the Georgia Supreme Court found the term
"sudden" ambiguous, construed it against the insurer and ruled
that in the context of the pollution exclusion the term means
"'unexpected and unintended.' "' Whether the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision marks a reversal of the trend in the battle over
the pollution exclusion or just a sharp split in one state's supreme
court is unclear.55
49 Id. at 1573-74.
81 Id. at 1579.
51 Id. at 1573.
52 Id. at 1580.
62 Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 865 F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1989).
51 Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 341, 380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (1989).
5 The Claussen decision does not return full c;-.e because the court did recognize that
the pollution exclusion is incongruent with the occurrence definition. Id. at 338, 380 S.E.2d
at 688-89. In the words of the court, the exclusion:
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IV. THE INSURING AGREEMENT AND COVERAGE FOR CLEANUP
COSTS
The provision in a liability insurance policy that sets forth an
insurer's twin duties to defend and indemnify the insured is called
the insuring agreement. The CGL insuring agreement at issue in
most litigated cases provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of... bodily injury or... property damage to which this insur-
ance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall
have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage .... "I
The duty of the insurer to defend under this clause is said to be
"separate from" and "broader than" the duty to indemnify. The
distinction arises because an insurer must defend its insured when-
ever the facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall within the
scope of policy coverage. By contrast, the obligation to indemnify
is based upon facts actually established at trial.17
A footnote to the law of liability insurance had been that the
insuring agreement's grant of coverage for "damages" did not re-
quire the insurer to reimburse the insured for the costs of comply-
ing with a mandatory injunction or restitutionary claims because
focuses on whether the 'discharge, dispersal or release' of the pollutants is unex-
pected and unintended; the definition of occurrence focuses on whether the prop-
erty damage is unexpected and unintended. The pollution exclusion clause there-
fore has the effect of eliminating coverage for damage resulting from the
intentional discharge of pollutants.
Id. (emphasis in original). However, in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coat-
ings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071, appeal denied, 127 In. 2d 643, 545 N.E.2d
133 (1989), the court found the pollution exclusion ambiguous and held that the wording of
the clause demonstrated "that any unintentional or unexpected contamination would still
be covered as an 'occurrence' under the policy." Id. at 388, 535 N.E.2d at 1077.
56 Defense Research Institute, Annotated Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
Policy §§ 4-1-4-2 (D. Dey & S. Ray eds. 1984).
See Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp.
1541, 1544-48 (S.D. Fla. 1987); National Grange Mut Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins.
Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404, 1407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 365, 522 N.E.2d 758, 761-62, appeal denied, 122
Ill. 2d 576, 530 N.E.2d 246 (1988); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
74 N.Y.2d 66, 73-74, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (1989); Waste Manage-
ment of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 691, 340 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1986); B.
OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 28, § 5.02, at 106.
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neither injunctive relief nor restitution constituted "damages.""8
This issue did not take on great significance because private suits
for injunctive relief or restitution typically also alleged that the de-
fendant's conduct diminished the value of the plaintiff's prop-
erty.19 In such situations, where one or more of the underlying
claims against the insured alleged damages in this traditional
sense, a liability insurer still had to defend the entire action.6
However, governmental proceedings to compel a private party to
clean a hazardous waste site or to obtain reimbursement of cleanup
costs do not seek "damages" in the traditional sense."1 Accord-
ingly, the question of whether injunctive or equitable monetary re-
lief constitutes "damages" within the meaning of the CGL policy
has generated a recent explosion of litigation. 2
The seminal cases concerning an insurer's obligation to reim-
burse the insured for the costs of complying with an injunction
arose in the 1950's. In Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co.,6 S the
8, See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (suit
for injunction to require insured to remove rocks and fill that encroached upon neighbor's
property and to build bulkhead to prevent further encroachments did not seek "damages");
Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435, 439-40 (D. Md. 1977) (SEC
action seeking injunction and "such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and
equitable" did not constitute a suit for "damages"); Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 73 Il. App. 3d 43, 45, 391 N.E.2d 568, 571-72 (1979) (suit seeking injunction requiring
insured to remove slag pile that collapsed upon railroad right-of-way did not claim "dam-
ages"); Jones v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 172 Mich. App. 24, 29, 431 N.W.2d 242, 245
(1988) (suit seeking abatement of public nuisance by permanent injunction did not allege
"damages"); Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 131, 106 A.2d 196, 198
(1954) (cost of compliance with mandatory injunction "not reasonably to be regarded as a,
sum payable 'as damages' "); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 100 App.
Div. 2d 820, 821, 474 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (Ist Dep't) (sums expended by insured to comply
with injunctive provisions of consent judgment "not within the purview of money damages
and are not recoverable under the policy"), appeal dismissed, 63 N.Y.2d 675, 484 N.E.2d
1058, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1060 (1984); Feed Store, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 774 S.W.2d 73, 75
(Tex. App. 1989) (suit for injunctive relief against alleged infringing service marks and for
"other and further relief" not an action for "damages").
" See, e.g., Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 132, 106 A.2d 196, 198-
99 (1954) (insurer had duty to defend entire suit and pay damages awarded in equity action
but did not have obligation to comply with mandatory injunction or to pay insured's ex-
penses in complying with injunction); Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., I N.Y.2d 439, 441-44, 136
N.E.2d 484, 485-87, 154 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12-14 (1956) (insurer had duty to defend suit for in-
junction that also alleged diminished value of property because court could have awarded
money damages).
40 See Doyle, 1 N.Y.2d at 443-44, 136 N.E.2d at 486-87, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 13-18; B. Os-
TRAGER & T. NWmAN, supra note 28, § 5.02[a], at 108.
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (CERCLA remediation and response costs).
42 See supra note 12.
63 99 N.H. 129, 106 A.2d 196 (1954).
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insureds obstructed a culvert while regrading their property which
had the effect of flooding the property of the adjoining landown-
ers." The insurer defended the insureds in the underlying action
and paid the damages awarded against them but refused to cover
the cost of complying with the court order to remove the obstruc-
tion.65 In refusing the insured's claim for losses due to the injunc-
tion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned that:
The cost of compliance with the mandatory injunction is not
reasonably to be regarded as a sum payable "as damages." Dam-
ages are recompense for injuries sustained .... They are remedial
rather than preventive, and in the usual sense are pecuniary in
nature .... The expense of restoring the plaintiff's property to its
former state will not remedy the injury previously done, nor will
it be paid to the injured parties.6 8
Similarly, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hanna,7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Florida law,
held that the insurer had no duty to defend a suit for a mandatory
injunction to compel the insureds to remove rocks and fill that en-
croached upon their neighbor's property and to build a bulkhead
to prevent future encroachments. 8 The court held that the costs of
repairs and preventative measures were not part of the insurer's
obligation to pay "for damages because of injury to or destruction
of property." 69
The leading cases adopting the insurance industry's position
in the environmental context have found no coverage based upon a
close reading of the insuring agreement and based upon the early
precedents holding that liability insurance does not cover the costs
of complying with an injunction or the payment of restitutionary
awards. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,70 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland
law, relied upon Hanna in holding that the insurer had no duty to
defend or indemnify. Armco concerned an underlying litigation
where the government sought to receive its costs in implementing a
comprehensive remedial action program and also all costs incurred
Id. at 131, 106 A.2d at 197.
05 Id.
Id. at 132, 106 A.2d at 198 (citations omitted).
224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 503 (emphasis in original).
70 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
[Vol. 63:755
ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
in actually remediating a dumpsite.71 The court observed that by
its terms the CGL policy did not cover equitable relief - other-
wise the use of the phrase "to pay as damages" would be superflu-
ous since any obligation to pay would be covered.72 The court also
set forth its view that liability insurance had been interpreted to
cover only traditional "damages" because the cost of remedial
measures is not necessarily related to the injury suffered by a third
party and because of the incentive to over-utilize precautionary
measures when someone else is paying the bill.73
Similarly, in Continental Insurance Cos. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.74 ("NEPACCO"), a five to three
majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, en banc, applying Missouri law, held that the insurer had no
obligation to defend or indemnify an insured in a governmental
suit for cleanup costs. 5 The court observed that the term "dam-
ages" as used in ordinary parlance may be ambiguous and open to
different constructions, 6 but continued: "In the insurance context,
however, the term 'damages' is not ambiguous, and the plain
meaning of the term 'damages' as used in the insurance context
refers to legal damages and does not include equitable monetary
relief."77 The court also analyzed the terms of the insuring agree-
ment, focusing again on the policy's limiting language. The court
found it significant that the CGL insuring agreement does not obli-
gate the insurer simply to pay "all sums" that the insured is obli-
71 Id. at 1350-51.
72Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 1353. The court reasoned that:
Insurance policies, probably for reasons of certainty and economy,
traditionally reimburse only damages arising from actual, tangible in-
jury. Insurers are very reluctant to cover what are essentially prophylac-
tic measures, such as safety precautions, for the obvious reason that
such expenditures are subject to the discretion of the insured, and are
not connected with any harm to specific third parties.... The less obvi-
ous, but perhaps more telling reason that insurers are reluctant to cover
avoidance costs is that insureds are far more likely to overutilize safety
measures where another party is paying the bill. Should policies be con-
strued to cover some forms of harm-avoidance measures, courts would
be faced with the very difficult problem of separating needed prophylac-
tic measures from unnecessary or inefficient ones.
Id.
7 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
7 Id. at 985-87.
76 Id. at 985.
7 Id.
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gated to pay, but limits the obligation to "all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages. 75
The many cases holding that cleanup costs are covered under
the terms of the CGL policy point out that whether such costs are
technically legal damages or equitable relief makes little difference
to the insured who suffers the expense.7 9 The courts that deliver
these opinions bridle at Armco and NEPACCO which, in their
view, employ an arcane distinction to deprive the average commer-
cial insured of coverage for out-of-pocket loss. Moreover, the
NEPACCO dissenters and critical courts have complained that the
Armco and NEPACCO decisions mistakenly emphasize general in-
surance law principles rather than applicable state substantive
law.80
The semantic dispute over the meaning of the term "damages"
has acquired a life of its own, and at this juncture the courts would
do well to take a step back and consider CEROLA cleanup costs in
light of the purposes of liability insurance.8 ' Waste disposal is, by
any standard, a cost of doing business and for many years the in-
dustry enjoyed the benefit of low-cost, ineffective waste disposal
because its activities were largely unregulated. The clean up obli-
gation now imposed by the federal and state governments repre-
sents a reinternalization of these costs. 82 If waste-handling is an
ordinary business operation, it is no less a cost of doing business
78 Id. at 986 (emphasis in original).
79 See supra note 12.
80 See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 987-90 (Heaney, J., dissenting); Chesapeake Utils.
Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 558-60 (D. Del. 1989); Intel Corp.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1186-87 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
81 This approach is just beginnuing to find articulation in the case law. See Mraz v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986) (response costs are "eco-
nomic loss," not "property damage"); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem.
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D. Idaho 1989) ("response costs are simply a government-
imposed cost of doing business for firms which release hazardous substances"); AIU Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 1234, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (6th Dist.) (federal
government seeks CERCLA response costs "as a direct exercise of the police power. The
government does not own the affected property;, rather it exercises its statutory authority to
compel cleanup for the benefit of the public at large"), review granted, 782 P.2d 595, 264
Cal. Reptr. 354 (1989); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 898, 784
P.2d 507, 525-26 (1990) (Callow, C.J., dissenting) (in enacting CERCLA, "Congress intended
that those who financially benefitted from [the] polluting activity internalize the health and
environmental costs of that activity into their cost of doing business").
82 See S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in Senate Comm. on Env't &
Pub. Works, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environ-




now that the government has compelled clean up after the fact.
Although industry may never have anticipated that government
would make it foot the cleanup bill, CERCLA is no different from
other regulatory measures that impose costs upon business such as
zoning regulations, emission control standards and taxes. Certainly
there is no suggestion that the tax assessments earmarked for
Superfund s* are covered by liability insurance.
V. LITIGANTS CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
While there will always be litigation at the margins, parties
that know their rights can act accordingly and prevent most dis-
putes from ending up in protracted, enormously expensive court
battles. Instead, in the environmental coverage area, the prevailing
uncertainty compels insurers and insureds to litigate the same ba-
sic questions repeatedly. The CERCLA scheme is particularly sus-
ceptible to this uncertainty because its success depends upon early,
efficient settlements with responsible parties in advance of cleanup
rather than after the fact suits by the government to recover costs.
Absent authoritative insurance rulings from the courts, CERCLA
cleanups will become mired in extensive coverage litigation. Recent
examples of judicial discord in litigation centers such as New York,
Illinois and California, signify an unfortunate trend for other
jurisdictions."4
83 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 59a, 4611-12, 4661-62, 4671-72 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
21 While the remainder of this article addresses the polarized benches in New York,
Illinois and California, there are other examples that strike at the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking in the environmental coverage area:
a) There is no basis to predict how the federal and state courts in Michigan will rule on
the issue of whether a PRP letter is a "suit." Compare Central Quality Services Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 87-CV-74473-DT, slip op. at 12-20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 1989)
(PRP letter not a "suit"); Arco Indus., Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. K88-380 CA4, slip op.
at 8-16 (W.D. Mich. June 26, 1989) (same); Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp.
231, 233-34 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (same); and City of Evart v. Home Ins. Co., No. 103621, slip
op. at 2-3 (Ct. App. Mich. April 10, 1989) (per curiam) (same) with Higgins Indus., Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 87-CV-10406 slip op. at 2-3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 1989) (PRP
letter is a "suit"); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (same); Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co., 180 Mich. App. 651, 654-57, 447 N.W.2d
853, 855-56 (1989) (per curiam) (same); United States Aviex. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125
Mich. App. 579, 587-90, 336 N.W.2d 838, 842-43 (1983) (same).
b) The decision by a Delaware federal district court in Chesapeake Util. Corp. v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 558-61 (D. Del 1989), holding that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit misstated Maryland law in Maryland Casu-
alty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1348 (1988),
and the decision of the federal district court in Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., No.
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A. New York
1. Early Precedents
Shortly after the promulgation of the standard pollution ex-
clusion, the New York legislature amended Section 46 of the Insur-
ance Law to require that the pollution exclusion clause be incorpo-
rated in all liability policies sold in New York State.85 The State
Executive Department indicated that the purpose of mandating
the exclusion for New York policyholders was to promote a clean
environment by preventing polluting corporations from shifting
the costs of waste disposal onto the insurance system.86 However,
88-5723, slip op. at 11-21 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1989) (Westlaw 1989 WL 71595), holding that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "clearly misread" Missouri law in
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
c) Three decisions by federal district courts in Michigan that have refused to follow
increasingly emphatic rulings from that forum's intermediate appellate court that "sudden
and accidental" as used in the pollution exclusion means only "unexpected and unin-
tended." Compare Ray Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1310, 1315-20 (E.D.
Mich. 1989); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1326 (E.D.
Mich 1988) and International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Anderson De. Co., No. 86-CV-
60392-AA, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 1987), question certified to the Supreme Court
of Michigan, No. 87-2102, order (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1989), certification declined, 432 Mich.
1239 (1989) with Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co., 180 Mich. App. 651, 657-58, 447 N.W.2d 853,
856 (1989) (per curiam); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 Mich. App. 706,
444 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1989); Jonesville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group., 156
Mich. App. 508, 512, 402 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1986), leave denied, 428 Mich. 987 (1987).
"I See Act of June 25, 1971, ch. 765, [1971] N.Y. Laws 1230 (McKinney). The amend-
ment was repealed in 1982 with the advent of financial responsibility regulations for compa-
nies that handle hazardous waste. See Act of July 27, 1982, ch. 856, t1982] N.Y. Laws 2029
(McKinney); Executive Memorandum, Hazardous Wastes-Financial Requirements For
Permits-Insurance Policies Covering Gradual Release, [1982] N.Y. Laws 2628
(McKinney).
86 The State Executive Department's Memorandum in support of the 1971 bill reads as
follows:
New York State has adopted stringent standards to prohibit despoiling the
environment through the discharge of noxious substances into the water and air.
These standards, which are the most comprehensive in the Nation, go far beyond
merely strengthening and supplementing the common law rules against pollution.
As strict as these laws are, however, their effectiveness could be substantially
reduced if polluters were to purchase insurance to protect themselves from having
to pay the fines and other liabilities that may be imposed upon them for polluting
the environment.
For example, a polluting corporation might continue to pollute the environ-
ment if it could buy protection from potential liability for only the small cost of
an annual insurance premium, whereas, it might stop polluting if it had to risk
bearing itself the full penalty for violating the law.
Many insurance companies have voluntarily initiated action to protect the en-
vironment by refusing to insure against liability arising out of environment
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the first decisions construing the exclusion arose in factual settings
that set state jurisprudence off on an aberrant note.
The first New York cases that construed the pollution exclu-
sion, Farm Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bagley,87 and Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Klock Oil Co.,"" arose in the Fourth Department.
Neither case concerned instances of industrial pollution-Bagley
involved a negligent crop sprayer and Klock Oil concerned a leak-
ing gasoline storage tank. Both cases found ambiguity in the "sud-
den and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion.
The Klock Oil panel was especially hostile to the exclusion.
The court dutifully noted the legislature's intent in mandating the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion for policies sold in
New York,89 but then stated that the public policy reflected in the
statute did not forbid the "enforcement" of an insurance con-
tract.9 0 Despite the fact that the leak from the underground tank
was plainly "accidental" within the meaning of the exclusion, the
court's broad-brush holding concerned itself not with the acciden-
tal nature of the discharge but with the unintended nature of the
result.91 On the issue of whether the leak from the gasoline storage
tank was "sudden", the court ruled that "the word 'sudden' as
used in liability insurance need not be limited to an instantaneous
happening.19 2 In other words, the pollution exclusion was the
equivalent of the "occurrence" definition."3
pollution.
The bill would help to assure that corporate polluters bear the full burden of
their own actions spoiling the environment, and would preclude any insurance
company from undermining public policy by offering this type of insurance
protection.
Memorandum of State Executive Department, Environmental Pollution-Prohibition
Against Insurance Coverage, [1971] N.Y. Laws 2485-86 (McKinney). See Ogden Corp. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., No. 88 Civ. 269, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1989) ("[t]he policy
behind § 46, which was in effect during much of the time the policies at issue here were in
effect, was to encourage a clean environment by eliminating 'subsidized pollution' ") (citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 App. Div. 2d 486, 487-88, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (4th
Dep't 1980)).
" 64 App. Div. 2d 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (4th Dep't 1978).
A 73 App. Div. 2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (4th Dep't 1980).
8Id. at 487-88, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
"1 73 App. Div. 2d at 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05.
91 Id.
92 Id.
" The court's opinion concluded:
Thus, regardless of the initial intent or lack thereof as it relates to causation,
or the period of time involved, if the resulting damage could be viewed as unin-
tended by the factfinder, the total situation could be found to constitute an acci-
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Two other early cases in New York presented unusual factual
situations where insurers invoking the pollution exclusion received
adverse rulings that further limited the exclusion's effectiveness. In
Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 4 a coverage ac-
tion arising from lawsuits brought by victims of the pollution at
Love Canal, the court mused that the pollution exclusion probably
did not apply even if the pollution damage in issue was intentional
because the County, although a party to the lawsuits, was not actu-
ally involved in waste disposal activities. 5 The court stated in
dicta that while there is no language in the exclusion limiting the
exclusion to the insured's acts or the insured's state of mind, the
legislative history of former Section 46 of the Insurance Law96 indi-
cated that the exclusion was intended to apply only to "actual pol-
luters. '97 One year later, in Autotronic Systems, Inc. v. Aetna Life
& Casualty,5 the Third Department squarely faced the "actual
polluter" question in a coverage dispute arising from an action
brought by an employee of a self-service gasoline filling station. In
the underlying lawsuit, the claimant alleged that due to the im-
proper design and construction of the filling station, she had sus-
tained serious physical injuries arising from exposure to toxic sub-
stances in leaded gasoline.99 While the court could have employed
the Klock analysis to find coverage, it held the exclusion inapplica-
ble because the insured was not responsible for discharging the
waste. 100 By testing the limits of the pollution exclusion in a case
that was little more than an ordinary products liability suit, the
insurer received a decision that became a precedent relied upon by
generators of hazardous waste that contracted for off-site waste
disposal.
2. The Response of the Federal Courts
By 1982, four appellate precedents in New York had construed
the pollution exclusion out of existence, yet not one of these cases
dent... and therefore within the coverage afforded by Allstate in the comprehen-
sive general liability insurance policy issued to Klock.
Id. at 488-489, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (citation omitted).
' 80 App. Div. 2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (4th Dep't 1981).
9' Id. at 418 n.2, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540 n.2.
9' See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
' 80 App. Div. 2d at 418, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
89 App. Div. 2d 401, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504 (3d Dep't 1982).
Id. at 402, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
... Id. at 403-04, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
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concerned an industrial polluter. The first case involving an indus-
trial polluter, National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co.,1°1 arose in federal district court in 1986. This
coverage action derived from a CERCLA proceeding commenced in
federal court by the State of New York against two related scrap
metal reclamation companies and their principal shareholders and
officers.10 2 Although by this time there had been a number of cases
from other jurisdictions supporting the insurance industry's con-
struction of the pollution exclusion, the court easily found for the
insureds based upon the construction of the pollution exclusion in
Klock Oil and Bagley.'0 In response to the insurer's argument that
Klock Oil and Bagley confused the pollution exclusion with the
"occurrence" definition, the court noted that the rulings of the Ap-
pellate Division were entitled to deference, 04 and stated that there
was no "other persuasive data"115 that led the court to believe that
the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, would hold
differently.108
In 1988, two New York federal courts responded to the trend
in the case law in other jurisdictions toward the insurance industry
position and broke ranks with the intermediate appellate decisions.
In BAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 0 7 the
underlying complaint alleged that ongoing disposal of radioactive
americanum-241 into a public sewer system resulted in the con-
tamination of the sewer system as well as the sewage treatment
plant and town landflfl. °5 The court distinguished the facts of the
prior New York decisions, but noted that to find coverage in these
circumstances would render the pollution exclusion "almost en-
tirely meaningless"'' 09 and, citing Commissioner v. Estate of
£01 650 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
102 Id. at 1406.
,0, Id. at 1410.
" Id. at 1412.
105 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). The Estate of Bosch case
stands for the proposition that the ruling of" 'an intermediate appellate state court... is a
datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide other-
wise."' Id. (quoting West v. AT.& T. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). This wonderfully flexi-
ble standard is available when federal courts wish to adhere to or depart from the rulings of
intermediate state appellate courts.
"I6 National Grange, 650 F. Supp. at 1412.
207 701 F. Supp. 399 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
,0, Id. at 400.
,0, Id. at 402.
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Bosch,110 stated that "New York's Court of Appeals would either
refuse to adopt them or decline to extend their holdings to a case
with a factual presentation substantially identical to the one before
the Court."'"
Shortly thereafter, another federal district court refused to fol-
low Klock Oil and Bagley. In New York v. Amro Realty Corp.,'12
the court reviewed all the New York cases and flatly stated that it
could not accept their premise that the pollution exclusion was
ambiguous. 13 The court expressed its view that the New York
Court of Appeals would follow the logic of other courts that have
held that "allegations of continued industrial pollution are clearly
outside of the 'sudden and accidental' exception to the pollution
exclusion clause.""11 4
3. The Technicon-Avondale Waltz
The first New York intermediate appellate decision construing
the pollution exclusion in a case of industrial pollution arose just
as the federal district courts began to distance themselves from the
earlier New York precedents. Technicon Electronics Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co.," 5 a Second Department decision,
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals,"16 concerned a New
York-based company that manufactured machines to analyze
blood samples in Puerto Rico." 7 In the underlying actions, local
residents claimed that they had suffered personal injury as a result
of exposure to toxic waste that Technicon had discharged into a
creek over a period of several years.1 8 In addition, the EPA noti-
fied Technicon in a PRP letter of the manufacturer's potential lia-
110 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1965); see supra note 105.
B RAD, 701 F. Supp. at 403.
697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
' Id. at 109-10. The lawsuits underlying the Amro Realty dispute alleged that the
site-owners had engaged in polluting activities from the early 1950's through 1981. Id. at
101. The court commented that "[e]ven if the term accidental is determined from the in-
sureds' point of view there is no use of the word 'sudden' which is consistent with events
transpiring over a twenty year period." Id. at 110.
114 Id. at 110.
"1 141 App. Div. 2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1988), afl'd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542
N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989). For a discussion of the Court of Appeals affirmance
see infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
11 Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. Americau Home Assur. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 76, 542 N.E.2d
1048, 1051, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (1989).




bility for cleanup and response costs." 9 In its answer to the com-
plaint in the private action, Technicon admitted discharging
industrial waste but stated that the discharges were lawful and
"'made pursuant to applicable permit applications.' ,,120 The Ap-
pellate Division held that Technicon's primary insurers had no
duty to defend or indemnify Technicon in the private action or in
connection with the EPA PRP letter. 2'
The Appellate Division first noted that neither the complaint
nor Technicon's answer made reference to any "sudden" or "acci-
dental" discharges. The court thus stated that there was no duty
to defend since "the factual allegations in the underlying com-
plaint clearly fall within the terms of the pollution exclusion and
cannot be interpreted to be within the 'sudden and accidental' ex-
ception to this exclusion." '122 The court reviewed the case law from
around the country concerning the pollution exclusion and noted
that the growing consensus was to define a "sudden and acciden-
tal" event as one that "is unexpected, unintended and occurs over
a short period of time."'23
The Appellate Division also ruled that since the basis of the
EPA notice was essentially the same as the basis for the private
119 Id., 533 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93.
120 Id. at 127, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
121 Id. at 146, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
12 Id. at 131, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
123 Id. at 137, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The Appellate Division, Third Department, declined
to adopt the Second Department's bright-line standard and instead, in Colonie Motors, Inc.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 145 App. Div. 2d 180, 538 N.Y.S.2d 630 (3d Dep't 1989),
opted for a "fact-based test" which essentially focuses on whether the insured intended the
discharge of pollutants. In that case, the court held that the insurer had an obligation to
reimburse the insured for clean-up costs incurred due to leaking waste-oil containment sys-
tem, stating: "The fact that the discharge was not readily discoverable and, thus, continued
for a period of time, through no fault of the insured, should not move an otherwise covered
occurrence within the rather shadowy perimeter of the exclusion." Id. at 183, 538 N.Y.S.2d
at 632. See Munzer v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 145 App. Div. 2d 193, 201-02, 538
N.Y.S.2d 633, 638 (3d Dep't 1989) (insurer had duty to defend several matters arising from
operations of insured's mercury thermometer plant between 1971 and 1984 because addi-
tional information needed to determine whether plaintiffs intended to discharge pollutants).
The Third Department adhered to its standard after the Court of Appeals' affirmance in
Technicon. See State v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 547 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (3d Dep't 1989).
However, the Court of Appeals' decision in Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74
N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989), discussed infra at notes 159-64 and
accompanying text, will require the Third Department either to modify its approach so that
the focus is no longer on the insured's intentions or to scrap its "fact-based test" in favor of
the bright-line standard.
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action, the pollution exclusion also applied to the EPA matter.124
While noting that it was an unsettled question whether the costs
sought by the EPA were "damages," 125 the court ruled that, in any
event, there was no duty to "defend" the PRP letter because the
letter did not constitute a "suit" within the meaning of the
policies.126
An immediate reaction to the Technicon decision came from
the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. In
Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,127 residents
of Denham Springs, Louisiana, brought a series of lawsuits alleging
bodily injury and property damage against the operators of a local
waste oil recycling facility and dumpsite and against Avondale and
others that shipped or transported waste to the site. In addition,
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") sent
Avondale a form PRP letter notifying Avondale that it was a po-
tentially responsible party under the Louisiana Liability for Haz-
ardous Substance Remedial Action Statute.128 Technicon's two-
week-old pollution exclusion ruling and the Appellate Division's
underlying reasoning should have received serious consideration
from the Avondale court. Instead, the district court relegated its
discussion of this aspect of the Technicon opinion to one sentence
in a footnote, distinguishing the Second Department's decision on
the ground that the insured in Technicon had conceded that it had
intentionally discharged industrial waste. 9
Having thus dispensed with the New York state court's last
ruling on the pollution exclusion, the district court found that the
insurer had a duty to defend the private actions. It recognized that
although the underlying complaints alleged that discharges of toxic
124 Technicon, 141 App. Div. 2d at 145, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
225 Id.
126 Id. at 146, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 105. The court stated:
The EPA letter at issue merely informed Technicon of its potential liability under
CERCLA and that the EPA was interested in discussing Technicon's voluntary
participation in remedial measures. The letter was an invitation to voluntary ac-
tion on Technicon's part and is not the equivalent of the commencement of a
formal proceeding within the meaning of the subject comprehensive general liabil-
ity policies.
Id.
Id 697 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), modified, 894
F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1990).
128 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:2271-:2280 (West 1988) (formerly codified at La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 30:1149.41-.50).
129 Avondale, 697 F. Supp. at 1317 n.4.
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waste occurred over the course of twenty years and each complaint
named Avondale as a source of the waste, absent were "allegations
as to how the waste escaped or seeped" and "as to Avondale's cul-
pable actions that contributed to the occurrence." 130 The court
then assumed for purposes of argument that even if the term "sud-
den" had a temporal component, the insurer still had a duty to
defend because the complaints did not refer specifically to dis-
charges of waste material that Avondale had shipped to the site.13'
The insurer in Avondale also argued that it had no obligations
with respect to the administrative matter because the state envi-
ronmental agency sought only reimbursement of cleanup costs
from the insured and not "damages." 32 While the federal district
court appreciated that there was a split in authority on this issue,
it held that under New York law the term should be construed
according to "'the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordi-
nary businessman,"' and stated that "[tlhe average businessman
does not differentiate between 'damages' and 'restitution;' in either
case, money comes from his pocket and goes to third parties."' 3
Notwithstanding the Appellate Division's ruling in Technicon,
the federal district court also held that the insurer had an obliga-
tion to defend the letter from the DEQ13 4 The Avondale court
stated that the decision of the Appellate Division was not control-
ling and emphasized that a federal court should not disregard the
decisions of intermediate appellate courts "'unless it is convinced
by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would
decide otherwise.' "131, However, instead of pointing to other "per-
suasive data" that the New York Court of Appeals would rule dif-
ferently, the district court proceeded to attack the reasoning of the
Appellate Division and those cases upon which the Appellate Divi-
sion relied. By imposing a duty to defend the DEQ letter without
any support beyond its own disagreement with the Second Depart-
ment, the federal district court redefined the Estate of Bosch stan-
dard to eliminate whatever element of self-restraint that decision
demands from the federal bench. 6
230 Id. at 1317.
331 Id.
132 Id. at 1318.
133 Id. at 1319.
13, Id. at 1333.
115 Id. at 1321 (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)).
'16 In West v. AT.& T. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940), the Supreme Court declared:
A state is not without law save as its highest court has declared it. There are many
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The Avondale court placed its emphasis on the fact that the
underlying complaints did not detail the insured's conduct or al-
lege that the insured intended to pollute. The Technicon opinion,
however, strongly suggested that for purposes of applying the pol-
lution exclusion, whether the insured itself caused the pollution
was irrelevant and the only consideration was the manner in which
the liability-causing event happened.13 7 Less than one month after
the district court's Avondale decision, in Powers Chemco, Inc. v.
Federal Insurance Co.,138 the Second Department unequivocally
rejected the "actual polluter" rationale of Niagara County and
Autotronic and held: "The clear and unambiguous language of the
pollution exclusion makes no exception for pollution caused by
someone other than the insured where that pollution is not 'sud-
den and accidental.' "I"
Against this background, the New York Court of Appeals ren-
dered its decision in Technicon.40 The court engaged in a straight-
forward analysis limited to the allegations in the complaint and
the language of the pollution exclusion, which the court found
"unambiguously plain."'14' The court stated that since the com-
plaint alleged a discharge of toxic waste resulting in pollution, the
exclusion applied.14 2 The court then turned to the question of
whether the allegations could be deemed to fall within the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the exclusion. The court rejected the
insured's contention that the exclusion did not apply because it
rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior
courts which are nevertheless laws of the state although the highest court of the
state has never passed upon them. In those circumstances a federal court is not
free to reject the state rule merely because it has not received the sanction of the
highest state court, even though it thinks the rule is unsound in principle or that
another is preferable.
Id.
I 7 Technicon, 141 App. Div. 2d at 1614, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 103. The Second Department
stated:
In our view, the logical and proper application of the pollution exclusion depends
solely upon the method by which the pollutants entered the environment. The
relevant factor is not whether the policyholders anticipated or intended the resul-
tant injury or damage, but whether the toxic material was discharged into the
environment unexpectedly and unintentionally or knowingly and intentionally.
Id. (citation omitted).
13 144 App. Div. 2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (2d Dep't 1988), afl'd, 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548
N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989).
13 Id. at 448, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1012.
14 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989).
141 Id. at 71, 542 N.E.2d at 1049, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
142 Id. at 74, 542 N.E.2d at 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
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did not intend the environmental harm or the specific injuries
claimed by the injured plaintiffs.4 3 Instead, the court concluded
that since the alleged discharges were not accidental there was no
coverage.4
Having found that Technicon's discharges were not "acciden-
tal," the Court of Appeals stated that it would be "superfluous" to
define the scope of the term "sudden."' 45 The court similarly de-
clined to rule upon whether the EPA letter constituted the institu-
tion of a "suit" that could trigger a duty to defend because the
pollution exclusion barred coverage."' By confining its discussion
to the meaning of the term "accidental," the decision set a pattern
for narrow resolution of environmental coverage issues in the con-
text of particular cases.
Once again, a federal tribunal spoke shortly after the state
court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
delivered its decision in Avondale, 47 using the occasion to issue an
opinion as broad in scope as the Court of Appeals' decision in
Technicon was narrow. In an opinion by Judge Cardamone, who
authored the Niagara County opinion while on the state bench
eight years earlier, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that the pollution exclusion did not relieve the insurer of
its duty to defend. 48 The court then proceeded to the issues of
whether the PRP letter from the Louisiana DEQ was a "suit"
' Id. at 75, 542 N.E.2d at 1050-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34. The court stated:
That argument fails because the pollution exclusion clause, by its own terms, does
not distinguish between intended or unintended consequences of intentional dis-
charges; rather, it excludes from coverage liability based on all intentional dis-
charges of waste whether consequential damages were intended or unintended....
To accept Technicon's interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause would oth-
erwise render that clause meaningless in context.
Id.
'" Id. at 74-75, 542 N.E.2d at 1050-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34.
'45 Id. at 76, 542 N.E.2d at 1051, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 534. The court strongly implied, how-
ever, that the term "sudden" had a meaning independent of the term accidental. Specifi-
cally, the court stated: "Since the exception is expressed in the conjunctive, both require-
ments must be met for the exception to become operative. Stated conversely, discharges
that are either nonsudden or nonaccidental block the exception from nullifying the pollution
exclusion." Id. at 75, 542 N.E.2d at 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 533. See Powers Chemco, Inc. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 911, 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (1989)
(exception to pollution exclusion not operative unless discharge of pollutants is "both 'sud-
den' and 'accidental').
140 Technicon, 74 N.Y.2d at 76, 542 N.B.2d at 1051, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
147 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), modified, 894 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1990).
148 Id. at 1204-06.
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within the terms of the insurance contract, 149 and whether cleanup
costs constituted "damages"150 -affirming the district court on
both counts. Although the Second Circuit acknowledged its re-
sponsibility to apply state law, the court made scant citation to
New York authority and displayed little, if any, deference to the
recent New York cases. 151
Like the district court, the Second Circuit distinguished
Technicon by focusing upon the insured's admission that it had
intentionally discharged hazardous wastes.152 However, that con-
cedsion is legally irrelevant for purposes of determining an in-
surer's duty to defend 58 and played no significant role in the New
1,9 See id. at 1206. With respect to the district court's interpretation of the term "suit,"
the Second Circuit made only a token effort to demonstrate adherence to New York prece-
dent by citing a single thirty-five year old arbitration case, Madawick Contracting Co. u.
Travelers Ins. Corp., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E.2d 520 (1954). The Second Circuit then found
the Second Department's Technicon ruling "distinguishable" on the ground that the PRP
letter in Technicon was, in the Appellate Division's own words, "an invitation to voluntary
action" while the correspondence at issue in Avondale was a "coercive demand letter." 887
F.2d at 1206. In point of fact, the remedies available to the EPA and DEQ are substantially
the same. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (liability for all costs of removal or reme-
dial action incurred by federal government or state) with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:2275(A),
(B) (formerly codified at LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 30:1149.45) (requiring responsible person to
undertake remedial action or pay costs of such action). Finally, the Second Circuit offered
the real basis for its ruling which was that "common sense argues that for Travelers to
proffer a defense now is better for it, Avondale, and the public interest in a prompt cleanup
of the hazardous waste." Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1206.
110 Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1206-07. Citing several New York cases for general proposi-
tions of insurance policy construction-but only federal precedents on the "damages" ques-
tion-the court held that the insurer had a duty to defend a governmental proceeding for
environmental cleanup under New York law. Id. The Second Circuit's opinion in this regard
reflects little more than a preference for one set of out-of-state authorities over another. In
fact, the only extant New York intermediate appellate precedent follows Hanna and holds
that liability insurance policies do not cover the costs of complying with a mandatory in-
junction. See Gulf & Western Indus. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 100 App. Div. 2d 820, 821, 474
N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 63 N.Y.2d 675, 484 N.E.2d 1058, 494
N.Y.S.2d 1060 (1984).
51 In contrast, see Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 88 Civ. 4269, slip op. at 5-
10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1989) (Westlaw, 1989 WL 116498), notable because it construes the
very same insurance policies as those at issue in Avondale, yet reaches a different result, at
least in part, because the federal district court took the state court precedents more seri-
ously. In Ogden, the underlying pleadings alleged pollution damage resulting from thirty-
three years of continuous discharges arising from scrap steel operations on property leased
to an insured. The court found for the insurer both because the underlying allegations of
contamination resulting from longstanding industrial operations could not be deemed "acci-
dental" and because the discharge of pollutants was not "sudden." Id.
12 Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1205.
l5S The answer to an underlying complaint has no bearing, either way, on an insurers
duty to defend. See Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 517 F.2d 1076,
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York Court of Appeals' decision, which correctly addressed only
the allegations of the underlying complaint. By explaining the
Technicon result in terms of the insured's admission "that it in-
tentionally discharged toxic wastes, ' 15 4 the court was able to so
narrow the Technicon decision that it was writing on a clean slate.
Disregarding the import of the Court of Appeals' decision, the
Second Circuit employed the district court's analysis that focused
upon the insured's conduct and the insured's particular waste
products rather than the nature of the discharge causing the dam-
age.155 Accordingly, the Second Circuit found a duty to defend the
underlying private complaints because none of their "conclusory
assertions" concerning the conduct that caused the pollution over
twenty years "'clearly negate' the possibility that discharge or es-
cape was 'sudden and accidental.' "
The district court did not have the benefit of the Second De-
partment's Powers Chemco decision when it issued its Avondale
decision. However, the Second Circuit simply ignored the Appel-
late Division's contrary opinion 57 when it held that the critical
factor for purposes of applying the pollution exclusion was whether
the insured "itself continuously and intentionally polluted."' 58
This approach, quite similar to the-"actual polluter" rationale em-
ployed by Judge Cardamone in Niagara County, became untenable
when the Court of Appeals affirmed Powers Chemco one month
after the Second Circuit's ruling.159
In Powers Chemco, the insured, a manufacturer of photo-
1077 (5th Cir. 1975); Zurich-American Ins. Cos. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 139 App. Div. 2d
379, 386, 531 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915 (1st Dep't 1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 621, 539 N.E.2d 1098, 541
N.Y.S.2d 970 (1989); J. APPLEmN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAc-ncE § 4683.01 at 61 (rev. ed.
1979).
151 Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1205.
15 See id.
15 Id.
15' See supra notes 138-39. The district court's opinion in Ogden Corp. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., No. 88 Civ. 4269 slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1989) (Westlaw, 1989 WL 116498),
reflects how taking a more sympathetic approach to the state deciiions leads to different
results. In reaching the conclusion that thirty-three years of industrial discharges were not
"sudden," the court noted its obligation to be guided by appellate division rulings in the
absence of other persuasive data that would be considered by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 8
n.4. The court then observed that Powers Chemco unequivocally confirmed the Second De-
partment's ruling that a "sudden" discharge must occur over a "short period of time." Id. at
9.
' Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1205.
15, Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d 1301, 549
N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989).
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graphic supplies and equipment, purchased a parcel of land on
which it discovered that its predecessor had buried hazardous
waste over a number of years. 60 The insured then entered into an
agreement with state authorities to clean up the site, and sought
indemnification for the costs of decontamination.''
The Court of Appeals continued its narrow resolution of envi-
ronmental coverage disputes by disposing of the Powers Chemco
case in a short memorandum decision. The court still did not inter-
pret the term "sudden," focusing instead upon allegations by the
state authorities that the insured's predecessor intentionally dis-
posed of hazardous waste on the property purchased by the in-
sured.16 2 It stated: "plaintiff seeks to be indemnified for intentional
discharges of waste, leading to the ultimate pollution of the envi-
ronnent. Such an 'occurrence,' resulting from purposeful conduct
cannot be considered 'accidental' under our analysis in
Technicon. '' 6 3 The memorandum opinion dismissed in a single
sentence the insured's argument that it was entitled to coverage
because it was not the "actual polluter." "Simply put," the court
declared, "there is nothing in the language of the pollution exclu-
sion clause to suggest that it is not applicable when liability is pre-
mised on the conduct of someone other than the insured.' ' 64
The insurer's petition for rehearing in the Avondale case was
pending when the Court of Appeals handed down its Powers
Chemco decision and accordingly the Second Circuit had to ad-
dress what had become a sharp divergence between its approach to
the pollution exclusion and the bright-line standard adopted by
the New York Court of Appeals.6 5 Acknowledging the discrepancy,
the Second Circuit ruled that it did not constitute grounds for re-
hearing because of differences in the factual allegations in the un-
derlying Louisiana private action complaints and the consent de-
cree entered between the insured and state authorities in Powers
Chemco. The Second Circuit stated that in Avondale, unlike Pow-
ers Chemco, no party "was alleged to have or admitted to having
engaged in intentional conduct that caused the pollution dam-
180 144 App. Div. 2d at 446, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
281 Id.
'2 Powers Chemco, 74 N.Y.2d at 911, 548 N.E.2d at 1302, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
2"3 Id.
24 Id.
280 See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1944); Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 424 F.2d
427, 428-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
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age." 6 The Second Circuit also chose to discount the allegations
that Avondale intentionally transported and disposed of waste at
the site, finding that the pleadings did "not negate the possibility
of intentional transportation and burying of properly sealed drums
containing wastes, followed by sudden and accidental discharge
from such drums1167
Under the most critical reading, each of the complaints in the
Louisiana private actions alleged that over the course of more than
twenty years the operations at the Denham-Springs oil reclamation
facility and dumpsite resulted in air, soil and water pollution. The
alleged pollution was the result of intentional operations, and
based upon the Court of Appeals' rulings in Technicon and Powers
Chemco the insurer should not have been obliged to defend
Avondale in the underlying litigation.
In order to put teeth in the pollution exclusion, the Technicon
decision did not require that the underlying pleadings negate any
remote possibility that ordinary industrial discharges were "sud-
den and accidental." Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the
pollution exclusion would bar coverage unless the underlying
pleadings made affirmative allegations within the "sudden and ac-
cidental" exception. 68 While the Second Circuit could not, after
Technicon and Powers Chemco, find the pollution exclusion am-
biguous, it has demanded such a high degree of specificity in the
underlying pleadings that it has, in effect, accomplished the same
result.
Underlying the Second Circuit's Avondale opinions is a policy
choice to put an end to litigation concerning the insurer's defense
obligations and to maximize the pool of insurance proceeds availa-
ble for environmental cleanup. The New York Court of Appeals,
11 Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 894 F.2d 498, 500 (1990).
167 Id.
its See Tecimicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73-74, 542
N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (1989); see also Waste Management Inc. v. Peer-
less Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 700, 340 S.E.2d 374, 383 (1986) (sudden release or escape of
contaminants must be expressly or impliedly alleged in pleading or deposition for occur-
rence to" be within coverage); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 151 Wis. 2d 593, 598, 445
N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring the underlying complaint to allege or
imply that the discharge of pollutants was accidental and sudden for the insurer to have
duty to defend); review granted, 449 N.W.2d 275 (1989). See generally 19 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INsUnANCE LAW § 79:385, at 338 (2d ed. 1983) (noting authority for proposi-
tion "that when a policy contains an exception within an exception, the insurer need not
negative the internal exception; rather, the plaintiff must show that the exception from the
exemption from liability applies").
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on the other hand, resolved to construe the policy language in ac-
cordance with New York's past legislative policy to deter pollution
by preventing industry from iassing the costs of ineffective waste
disposal to the insurance system. In this vein, the Technicon opin-
ion cited the legislative history of former Insurance Law § 46189 as
evidence that the exclusionary language limits insurance coverage
available to generators who are responsible for pollution even if
they acted legally and did not intend to cause harm.170
Whatever the merits of the respective points of view, at least
since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,'71 a federal court, sitting in
diversity, does not have the power to arrogate for itself the deci-
sion-making authority constitutionally vested in the state courts.
In Avondale, the Second Circuit violated its obligations b& con-
ducting what amounts to a holding action designed to minimize
the impact of state law rulings by New York's highest court. As a
result, there are now two bodies of New York environmental cover-
age law-one state and one federal-and litigants are faced with
the prospect of receiving very different kinds of hearings depend-
ing upon whether their cases are in federal or state court.17 2
B. Illinois
1. Early Precedents
Illinois had two early pollution exclusion decisions. The first,
Willett Truck Leasing Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 7 3 in-
volved a truck leasing company that allegedly was negligent in al-
'19 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
170 See Technicon, 74 N.Y.2d at 76, 542 N.E.2d at 1051, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
271 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
172 In a related development, the New York courts and the Second Circuit appear to be
in conflict on the standard necessary to demonstrate whether pollution damage is caused by
an "occurrence." Compare City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146,
1150-1151 (2d Cir. 1989) (insurer had duty to defend CERCLA proceeding against city in
connection with waste leaking from city-owned and operated landfill because although city
federal and state authorities warned that landfill was apparently contaminating ground-
water, city neither intended to cause harm nor did city expect "that those damages would
flow directly and immediately from its intentional acts" but instead, in opting to keep land-
fill open, city merely took a "calculated risk") with County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 146 App. Div. 2d 337, 340, 540 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (3d Dep't 1989) (insurer had no
duty to defend federal and state proceedings against county that owned and operated a
landfill because there was no "occurrence" where county was aware of pollution and leakage
problems but continued to permit dumping), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 614, 547 N.E.2d 103,
547 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1989).
173 88 Ill. App. 3d 133, 410 N.E.2d 376 (Ist Dist. 1980).
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lowing fumes to enter the cab of one of its trucks.1 4 At the time of
the decision there was very little outstanding case law construing
the exclusion and the court ordered the insurer to defend -without
raising any of the interpretive issues.175
In the second case, Reliance Insurance Co. v. Martin,76 de-
cided four years later, the court relied heavily upon New York's
Klock Oil decision.2' In Reliance, the operator of a parking garage
sought coverage for a suit brought by owners of an adjacent condo-
minium who allegedly suffered harm from carbon monoxide and
soot that" 'regularly'" escaped from the garage into their home." 8
Following the early mold, the court held that under the KIock Oil
analysis the relevant question was "not the time frame involved"
but whether the insured could have "intended or expected" the
pollutants to enter the condominium unit.17 9 The court found that
this fact could not be determined from the pleadings and thus or-
dered the insurer to defend.180
2. International Minerals, Specialty Coatings and the Use of
Policy Drafting History as a Precedent-Breaking Device
As in New York, the first test of the pollution exclusion in a
case concerning industrial discharges did not arise in Illinois until
1988. The case, International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Lib-
erty Mutual Insurance Co.,"8 concerned the same site that was
the subject of the First Circuit's Great Lakes Container " decision
four years earlier. International Minerals had owned the site and
operated the barrel reconditioning business for a three year period
in the mid-1970's before selling the property to Great Lakes
Container Corporation. 183 International Minerals was similarly
sued by the EPA in the district of New Hampshire for cleanup and
171 Id. at 135, 410 N.E.2d 377.
175 Id. at 139, 410 N.E.2d at 381.
176 126 flI. App. 3d 94, 467 N.E.2d 287 (Ist Dist. 1984).
177 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 App. Div. 2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (4th Dep't.
1980); see supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
178 Reliance, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 96 , 467 N.E.2d at 288.
171 Id. at 98, 467 N.E.2d at 290.
280 Id.
181 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 122 Ill. 2d 576, 530
N.E.2d 246 (1988).
121 Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.
1984); see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
18 International Minerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 365, 522 N.E.2d at 761.
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response costs."8 4
The Illinois appellate court differed with the First Circuit in
Great Lakes by finding that the facts stated in the underlying
complaint at least potentially alleged an "occurrence".188 Accord-
ingly, the court turned to the pollution exclusion. The court noted
the split in authorities interpreting the exclusionary language1 8
and then commenced its own analysis. As a preliminary matter,
the court found the complaint plainly alleged that International
Minerals had discharged hazardous waste that resulted in damage
and thus the exclusion applied.1 87 In discussing whether the allega-
tions fell within the exception to the exclusion, the court stated:
Whereas the general insuring provision focuses only on the dam-
age and the pollution exclusion clause focuses on the event or ac-
tivity as well as on the nature of the damage, the exception is
concerned only with the event or activity-the discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape of pollutants. If that discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is both sudden and accidental, coverage removed
by the exclusion is restored. 88
The court stated that there was a "remote potentiality" that
the alleged discharges could be considered "accidental" for pur-
poses of the exception to the exclusion.""9 Nevertheless, the court
found no basis in the allegations for the insured to claim that the
discharge was "sudden." 190 With respect to the line of cases which
held that the term "sudden" meant unexpected and unintended,
the court found their reasoning "seriously flawed" because those
decisions made the term "sudden" synonymous with "accidental"
and thus read the term "accidental" out of exception, and deprived
the term "sudden" of its commonly understood temporal
significance. 191
The court made an unpersuasive effort to reconcile its decision
with Reliance on the ground that the Reliance court did not find
the pollution exclusion ambiguous and held only that there was an
issue of fact as to whether the release of soot and carbon monoxide
184 Id.
285 Id. at 374-75, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
188 Id. at 373-74, 522 N.E.2d at 765-766.
"" Id. at 375-76, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
188 Id. at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 767-68.
189 Id. at 377, 522 N.E.2d at 768.
190 Id. at 376-77, 522 N.E.2d at 768.
191 Id. at 378, 522 N.E.2d at 769.
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was sudden and accidental.192 However, the court continued:
"[T]o the extent that Reliance adapted the reasoning in KIock
and/or stands for the proposition that "sudden and accidental"
... [means] "unintended and unexpected," with reference to the
mental state, i.e., intentions and expectations, of the insured we
think it is incorrect and respectfully but unhesitatingly decline to
follow it.193
Less than one year later, in United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 94 a different panel of the same
court had much the same reaction to International Minerals. The
Specialty Coatings panel disinterred Reliance, which, in the words
of the panel, "rendered any time factor inherent in the term 'sud-
den' irrelevant and concluded that where the resultant damage was
neither expected nor intended, the pollution exclusion did not
apply.$1 95
Specialty Coatings involved affiliated chemical companies
-Specialty Coatings and Specialty Chemical-that were sued by
the State of Illinois for providing waste to a hauler who illegally
dumped the waste on its property. 9 6 In addition, Specialty Coat-
ings received a PRP letter from the EPA informing it of potential
liability under CERCLA for cleaning up the Illinois site. 97
The Specialty Coatings court distinguished the case from In-
ternational Minerals by noting that in the previous case the in-
sured was charged with "active polluting conduct" whereas Spe-
cialty Coatings and Specialty Chemical allegedly did no more than
deliver their waste to the third parties actually responsible for the
pollution.' The Specialty Coatings court ignored the bright-line
approach of their colleagues in International Minerals who looked
only to the nature of the discharge. Instead, it held that the pollu-
tion exclusion was ambiguous where the insured was not an "active
polluter." The Specialty Coatings panel found this ambiguity in
112 Id. at 379, 522 N.E.2d at 769-70.
193 Id., 522 N.E.2d at 770.
19 180 IM. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 127 II. 2d 643, 545
N.E.2d 133 (1989). *
135 Id. at 385-86, 535 N.E.2d at 1076.
296 Id. at 381-82, 535 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
197 Id. at 382, 535 N.E.2d at 1074. Both companies were also third-party defendants in
a suit by the EPA for cleanup and response costs in connection with two industrial dump
sites in Gary, Indiana. The third-party action sought contribution from ninety parties, in-
cluding the insureds. Id.
193 Id. at 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1077.
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the pollution exclusion's drafting history.199 According to the opin-
ion, the historical record developed by the insured and amicus cu-
riae, persuaded the court that the insurance industry did not in-
tend the pollution exclusion to restrict coverage beyond the
limitations of the "occurrence" definition. 00 Moreover, in light of
this history, the court found that "interpreting 'sudden' to mean
'abrupt' and 'instantaneous' contravenes the insurance industry's
announced intent in adding the pollution exclusion to the general
liability policy."20' After finding the pollution exclusion inapplica-
ble, the Specialty Coatings panel ruled that the insurer had an
obligation to defend the PRP letter 02 and that the reimbursement
for cleanup and response costs sought in the three underlying mat-
ters constituted "damages. '20 3
The drafting history of the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion has been urged recently by a number of commentators to
support their position that the insurance industry designed the ex-
clusion to limit coverage only in situations where an insured actu-
ally expects or intends to harm the environment.0 4 They find their
proof in submissions by the Insurance Rating Board and Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau to obtain approval of the new clause
from state regulatory bodies. For example, an oft-cited explanatory
memorandum prepared by the industry trade groups states:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in
most cases under present policies because the damages can be
said to be expected or intended and thus are excluded by the def-
inition of occurrence. The above clarifies this situation to avoid
any question of intent. Coverage is continued for pollution or con-
tamination caused injury when the pollution or contamination re-
sults from accident. 20 5
The flaw in this drafting history is that it is not "history" at
all because it fails to account for changes in the meaning of the
1" Id. at 385, 535 N.E.2d at 1076.
200 Id. at 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1076.
201 Id.
2o2 Id. at 388-89, 535 N.E.2d at 1078-79.
203 Id. at 390-95, 535 N.E.2d at 1079-82.
204 See Sayler & Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the CGL Drafters:
The Effect of Living Backwards, Mealey's Lit. Rpts. (Insurance) 4425, 4432-34 (1987); Price,
Evidence Supporting Policyholders in Insurance Coverage Disputes, Nat. Resources &
Env't, Spring 1988, at 17, 19, 48; Anderson & Luppi, Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Actions-You Can Count On It, Risk Mgmt., Oct. 1987, at 68, 70.
20 Sayler & Zolensky, supra note 204, at 4432.
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terms "accident" and "occurrence" over time. First, while the un-
derwriters had a clear idea of what they meant by the term "acci-
dent," it is apparent that they added the term "sudden" in the
exclusionary clause because of the manner in which the courts had
treated the "caused by accident" language in the pre-1966 stan-
dard liability policy.2 06 Second, prior to 1970 there were very few
judicial decisions interpreting the "occurrence" definition. It is
only from the perspective of twenty years of judicial expansion of
the "occurrence" language,07 that the pollution exclusion seems
far more restrictive than a simple "clarification" of the "occur-
rence" definition.0 8
In any event, to the extent the Specialty Coatings panel pur-
ports to make a principled use of policy drafting history to distin-
guish the case from International Minerals, the court is disingenu-
ous. The Specialty Coatings panel is silent as to whether the
International Minerals court had the benefit of the historical evi-
dence that it found dispositive. However, the same counsel ap-
peared for the amicus curiae Illinois Manufacturers' Association in
both cases,209 and, in fact, counsel made similar arguments.2 10 At
least for the Specialty Coatings panel, the drafting history pro-
vided little more than a means to overcome the obstacle of an in-
convenient decision of another panel of the same court in order to
reach an outcome to which it was otherwise predisposed.2 11
216 See Wilmarth, Pollution Liability-What Are the Insurance Companies Doing In
This Area?, 21 FED'N INS. Cours. Q. 18, 20-21 (1971); Note, supra note 25 at 1252.
207 See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573-74 (S.D. Ga.
1987), question certified to Supreme Court of Georgia, 865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1989); De-
velopments in the Law, Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. Rav. 1458, 1583 (1986), Note,
supra note 25, at 1246-50.
208 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
208 See International Minerals, 168 11. App. 3d at 365, 370 n.3, 522 N.E.2d at 760, 764
n.3 (1988); Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 380, 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1073, 1077.
210 Brief for Amicus Curiae Illinois Manufacturers' Association at 18-21, International
Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 M11. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1st
Dist. 1988) (No. 870-0505), reprinted in MNfE.Y's Lrr. RPTS. (INstURArc) 4587, 4601-4602
(1987); Brief for Amicus Curiae Illinois Manufacturers' Association at 28-38, United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1st
Dist. 1989) (No. 87-3852).
2I One historian, criticizing the Supreme Court's embrace of partisan "law office" his-
tory as a precedent-breaking device, aptly remarked: "A historical or scientific truth may be
useful, but in the liberal system of values that usefulness is expected to flow from truth as
an independent entity. The truth of history does not flow from its usefulness." Kelly, Clio
and the Court, An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 119, 157.
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C. California
The controversy in California has been over whether the costs
of environmental cleanup are "damages" within the meaning of the
insuring agreement. There was only one unreported superior court
decision, holding that they were not,212 at the time a federal dis-
trict court was called upon to predict California law in Intel Corp.
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.213 There, the insured, Intel,
stored chemical solvents used in its manufacturing operations in
an unsecured underground storage tank.1 4 In 1981, Intel commis-
sioned soil sampling and testing of the site and determined that
the solvents had contaminated the soil and groundwater.1 5 Intel
ultimately entered into a consent decree with the EPA by which it
agreed, without admitting liability, to implement containment and
cleanup measures.216
The district court was quite conscious of its obligation to ap-
ply California law in the diversity case and, while discussing deci-
sions from other jurisdictions, sought guidance from California
cases and statutes. The court began with the proposition that
under California law insurance contracts are to be read "'in the
light of the reasonable and normal expectations of the parties as to
the extent of the coverage.' "217 Under this standard, the court had
little trouble finding that there had been damage and that the
state and people of California had suffered a detriment for which
they were entitled to damages."' Although the consent decree re-
quired payments by Intel to clean up its own property in order to
abate the contamination, the court deemed these payments mitiga-
tion of damages and cited Globe Indemnity Co. v. State of Califor-
nia,"' as authority that California recognized a right to indemnifi-
cation for mitigation costs. 20
In Globe Indemnity, the State of California brought suit for
212 Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Union Oil Co., No. C514 463, slip op. at 3 (L.A. Cty. Nov.
24, 1987).
213 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
214 Id. at 1172.
216 Id. at 1172-73.
218 Id. at 1173. The pollution exclusion was not an issue in the case because the insurer
failed to specify the exclusion as a ground for disclaiming coverage. Id. at 1176-80.
217 Id. at 1189-90 (quoting Globe Indem. Co. v. State, 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 751, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 75, 79 (5th Dist. 1974)).
218 Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1189.
219 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75 (5th Dist. 1974).
220 Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1191-92.
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the costs of suppressing a fire caused by the insureds.2 2' The in-
surer instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether its liability policies covered the costs claimed by the
state.22 The California court stated:
When an insured takes out an indemnity policy, as in this case, it
is more reasonable to suppose that he expects to be protected by
his insurance in any situation wherein he becomes liable for dam-
age to tangible property. It would seem strangely incongruous to
him, as it does to us, that his policy would cover him for damages
to tangible property destroyed through his negligence in allowing
a fire to escape but not for the sums incurred in mitigating such
damages by suppressing the fire.223
Based upon the Globe Indemnity analysis, the district court in
Intel concluded that the California Supreme Court would hold
that liability insurance policies cover the costs incurred by the in-
sured in investigating and cleaning up pollution that is damaging
to public property and presenting a continuing threat to public
health.224 The court then offered a public policy justification for its
holding, claiming that "[p]rospects for PRP cooperation would be
undermined if insurer's contributions are made contingent on a
government cleanup first, followed by a judgment against the in-
sured, and then a claim against the insurer.
225
The California Court of Appeals has now had the occasion to
articulate state law on the "damages" issue in two cases, Aerojet-
*General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court226 and AIU
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.227 Both cases concerned the obli-
gation of general liability insurers to reimburse insureds for the
cost of environmental cleanup. Both cases focus their attention
upon the reasonable expectations of the insureds in determining
whether the policies afford coverage for equitable monetary relief.
Both cases-decided within five months of each other-reached di-
ametrically opposite results.228
'1 Globe Indemnity, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 749, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
222 Id.
2 Id. at 751, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
224 Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1192.
213 Id. at 1193.
'21 209 Cal. App. 3d 973, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, reh'g denied, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258
Cal. Rptr. 684 (Ist Dist. 1989).
227 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182 (6th Dist.), review granted, 782 P.2d 595,
264 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1989).
22" Neither case discusses the pollution exclusion because both were interlocutory ap-
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In Aerojet-General, the State of California and the United
States sued the insured in three separate actions for injunctions to
prevent the discharge of toxic waste from its research and develop-
ment facility near Sacramento, for removal of waste from the
groundwater and removal of waste yet to reach the groundwater.
The insured also was sued for reimbursement of response costs al-
ready expended by state and federal agencies.2 ' The parties en-
tered into a consent decree that resolved the lawsuits and estab-
lished Aerojet-General's obligation to pay cleanup and response
costs.23 0 Aerojet-General, in turn, sought to recoup the costs from
its insurers. In ruling for the insured, the court stated that: "[f]rom
the standpoint of the lay insured, 'damages' could well include any
sum expended under sanction of law, including both money dam-
ages and sums paid out to an injured party in response to its claim
for equitable relief."23' The Aerojet-General opinion distinguished
the Armco 2 " and NRPACCO s3 decisions on the ground that they
used a narrow definition of the term "damages" at odds with Cali-
fornia's standard that requires an insurance policy to be read as a
lay person would read it. 234
AIU Insurance concerned the obligations of the insurers of
FMC Corporation to provide coverage to FMC in environmental
actions brought by federal and state agencies at various sites na-
tionwide.3 5 In these proceedings, the agencies sought both reim-
bursement for the costs of investigating and remediating pollution
caused by FMC, and to compel FMC to take preventative and re-
peals from partial summary adjudications of the "damages" issue only. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 437c, subd. (1) (discussed in AU, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1223, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 184).
229 Aerojet-General, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 974, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
20 Id. at 975, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
231 Id. at 980, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 627. The court further stated:
Since the insured purchased insurance for property damage resulting from its
negligent conduct, the ambiguity is enhanced: the insured may reasonably expect
coverage for any sums expended, either at law or equity, as a result of the in-
sured's causing property damage to another. The insured could thus reasonably
conclude it was covered for environmental cleanup costs, imposed upon it by the
government to remedy and prevent property damage, as well as traditional legal
damages.
Id.
232 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); see supra notes 70-
73 and accompanying text.
233 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir) (en banc), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988); see supra notes
74-78 and accompanying text.
23' Aerojet-General, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 983, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 632.




The court held that in accordance with the precedents deriv-
ing from Hanna,2 . 7 insurance companies did not intend to assume
"the massive and open ended risk of the costs of the insured's
compliance with mandatory injunctions to remedy toxic pollution
conditions. '" 238 Liability insurance policies, the court concluded,
simply were never intended to "foot the bill" for CERCLA-like
remedies because the potentially enormous liability is out of pro-
portion to the risk insured.23 9 The AU panel noted that this issue
was not confronted in the Globe Indemnity mitigation of damages
decision because in that case there was no serious discrepancy be-
tween the fire suppression costs and the costs of fire damage to the
adjacent property.240
With respect to Aerojet-General, the AU court stated that it
did not disagree with its sister court to the extent that the Aerojet-
General panel held that state and federal agencies could recover
"damages" for tangible injury to proprietary governmental inter-
ests in property.241 However, the court continued:
[I]nsofar as the decision holds that there is coverage for the costs
of compliance with the police power, we must respectfully disa-
gree. Otherwise, we would disregard the unambiguous language of
the policies here and completely distort well founded doctrines of
insurance policy interpretation, as well as discard a mass of au-
thority that compels our conclusion that, when the parties con-
tracted for the insurance policies" here, they could not reasonably
have expected that the liability for damages provisions would
cover response costs under CERCLA (or analogous provisions). 242
Lastly, the AU Insurance court treated the public policy ar-
gument raised by the insured and also discussed in Intel. The
court commented that regardless of the private views of its own
members, its role was "limited to interpreting the language of
these contracts in light of well-established legal principles. '24 The
court declined "the invitation to assume the role of legislators.22 44
258 Id.
237 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955); see supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
23U A Insurance, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1224, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
239 Id.
210 Id. at 1226, 262 CaL. Rptr. at 188.
21 Id. at 1226-27, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1230, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
244 Id.
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This issue will soon be resolved in California since the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has granted review in AIU Insurance.2 "
Whatever the ultimate resolution of this issue, AIU Insurance has
one analytical advantage over Aerojet-General which is that the
AU Insurance court made a serious effort to decide the case ac-
cording to what it believed were the objectively reasonable expec-
tations of an insuied in FMC Corporation's position. Aerojet-Gen-
eral's interpretation of insurance contracts held by a multinational
aerospace company "from the perspective of a layperson"246 blinks
at reality and thus cannot possibly form the foundation for sensi-
ble jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contract analysis that judges perform in insurance cover-
age disputes is familiar and routine. However, in high-stakes,
highly charged environmental coverage litigation, courts applying
the same general principles often do not agree. At best, the dis-
agreements ieflect legitimate differences of opinion. At worst, as in
New York and Illinois, competing courts ignore the precedents
that supposedly bind them.
One immediate result of all this was that in 1986 ISO exten-
sively revised the standard CGL policy, which among other
changes, includes a sweeping pollution exclusion that eliminates
the "sudden and accidental" exception.247 However, because pollu-
tion damage frequently happens over long periods of time and is
often not discovered until long after the pollution begins, pre-1986
policies will be litigated well into the next century. In the end, if
things continue as they are, the process of case-by-case adjudica-
tion will yield a rough justice with insurers and industry each pay-
ing a share of the daunting tab for cleaning up the environment.
For the present, the disarray in the judiciary, which makes
2,5 AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 782 P.2d 595, 264 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1989).
2,6 Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 973,
985, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626, reh'g denied, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1st Dist.
1989). See supra note 14 for a discussion of the level of sophistication on the part of large
insureds in negotiating with their insurers.
147 See Hendrick and Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms-An In-
troduction and Critique, 36 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. 319, 343-50 (Summer 1986). The new pol-
lution exclusion also addresses the statutory liability imposed upon polluters as well as the
split of authority on the "damages" question, expressly excluding. "Any loss, cost or expense
arising out of any governmental directive or request that you test for, monitor, clean-up,
remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants." Id. at 347.
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every case a potential winner, only encourages more litigation. But
before they enter the fray both insurers and insureds should take
pause. Only fools fight in a burning house.

